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is committed to buy outstanding government securities.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we explore the effects of government intervention through unem-
ployment benefits on macroeconomic dynamics. In particular, we slightly modify
the agent based decentralized matching macroeconomic model proposed in Ric-
cetti et al. (2012) to allow the government to transfer a certain amount of money
to unemployed people. In general, we show that the presence of such a public
intervention in the economy stabilizes the aggregate demand and the financial
conditions of the system at the cost of a modest increase of both the inflation rate
and the ratio between public deficit and nominal GDP. The successful action of the
public sector is sustained by the operation of the central bank which is committed
to buy outstanding government securities.
There is a huge literature which analyzes the role of unemployment insurance
on both individual behavior and aggregate dynamics. From a microeconomic point
of view, many papers analyze the nature of incentives and how the introduction
of an unemployment insurance scheme modifies individual behavior regarding
labor supply, that is the choice between leisure and working time. A typical
result is that there is an adverse income effect of “high” unemployment insurance
on the incentive to search and accept an employment opportunity. Moreover,
“high” unemployment benefits reduce the opportunity costs of unemployment,
resulting in a higher wage demand and an incentive to lower labor effort on the
workplace. Other researchers noticed that unemployment benefits can have also
positive consequences as the improvement of the quality of the matching between
employers and employees (Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000) or the welfare-improving
effect which emerges when people looking for jobs are liquidity constrained
(Bender et al., 2009). Many contributions analyzed the effects of unemployment
benefits on employment and unemployment dynamics on the basis of a “search
and matching” framework (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999a,b; Pissarides, 2000).
According to this theoretical framework the presence of unemployment insurance
produces more unemployment, because of the increase of workers’ bargaining
power that decreases the marginal benefit for firms of the search and matching
process. Moreover, the unemployment insurance operates as a friction in the labor
market, modelled as a search and matching aggregate function, which amplifies
business fluctuations.
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In mainstream macroeconomics, the presence of unemployment benefits en-
hances the bargaining power of workers with respect to firms, so leading to an
increase of requested wages that, for a given mark-up set by firms, makes the
“natural” rate of unemployment (Friedman, 1968; Phelps, 1968), that is the Non-
Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment, to rise (Turner et al., 2001). Hence,
ceteris paribus, the higher the level of unemployment benefits the larger the rate
of unemployment in the macroeconomic equilibrium. Basically, the “natural” rate
of unemployment depends on the workers’ reservation wage (that is the bargain-
ing power which is inversely dependent on the unemployment rate and directly
related to the degree of unionization, unemployment benefits, etc.), the degree of
monopoly in markets (that is the mark-up set by firms), and labor productivity
(which depends on many variables as the accumulation of physical and human
capital, and then technological progress and workers’ skills). In such a mainstream
framework, there is not an impact of the aggregate demand on equilibrium unem-
ployment (but for a limited period of time if agents are characterized by adaptive
expectations instead of rational expectations). Accordingly, the main effect of
the unemployment insurance is to act as a rigidity that pushes away the economy
from Pareto optimality (the same holds for other frictions). In principle, indeed,
if a demand shock hits the macroeconomy, so leading to higher unemployment,
the system is able to spontaneously returns to its “natural” equilibrium through a
decrease of nominal wages and (with a constant mark-up) a proportional reduction
of prices (although policy makers can avoid such a deflationary process of adjust-
ment through an expansionary monetary and/or fiscal policy). Moreover, in such a
“natural” equilibrium setting, monetary policy is mainly addressed to assure a low
and stable rate of inflation, as the best way to promote macroeconomic stability
and a growth-enhancing environment (Allsopp and Vines, 2000). For these reasons,
according to the conventional view, the central bank has to be independent of the
government in setting monetary policy (Walsh, 2010).
However, there are many contributions in the macroeconomic field which
investigate the role of unemployment insurance in stabilizing output fluctuation.
The transfer of a benefit from the government to unemployed people works as an
automatic stabilizer, thus providing a countercyclical action of the public sector
which sustains the aggregate demand. When the credit market is imperfect, given
that the relationship between lenders and borrowers is characterized by asymmetric
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information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), the additional liquidity provided by the
government, that issues bonds to finance unemployment benefits, mitigates the
credit constraint to the economy. In such an asymmetric information context, the
typical working of credit markets produces financially constrained business cycles
(Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993). Consequently, the removal or at least the mitigation
of the liquidity constraint may improve macroeconomic performances.
Challe et al. (2011) analyze the role of unemployment insurance when capital
markets are imperfect, highliting the macroeconomic nexus between unemploy-
ment benefits, public debt and liquidity-constrained firms. Their starting point is
the idea that firms can mitigate the liquidity constraint through buying and holding
liquid assets to be sold when they need to finance hiring and production (Holm-
strom and Tirole, 1998). As a matter of fact, when firms are liquidity constrained,
a higher public debt “increases the flexibility of the private sector in responding to
variations in both income and spending opportunities, and so can increase economic
efficiency” (Woodford, 1990, p. 382). According to Challe et al. (2011), the gov-
ernment raises public debt during recessions to transfer benefits to the unemployed,
thus implying an increase of liquidity supply that relaxes the credit constraint faced
by firms; in this way, the government (which does not follow a balanced public
budget rule) dampens the fall of employment which happens during recessions and
stimulates households’ consumptions because (i) unemployed people now have
an income to be spent, and (ii) the sustained aggregate demand improves firms’
profits, thus allowing for higher consumption on the part of entrepreneurs too.
As suggested by the cited literature, then, issuing public securities the govern-
ment improves liquidity conditions on private markets, so mitigating the credit
constraint to firms and improving macroeconomic performance. As we will see,
indeed, in our model the introduction of unemployment benefits modifies the finan-
cial conditions of the macroeconomy, for example influencing firms’ leverage and
banks’ exposure and the impact of these financial variables on the business cycle.
The recent financial turmoil has stressed the relevance of financial factors and the
fundamental role of leverage cycles in shaping macroeconomic dynamics. Accord-
ingly, many recent contributions have proposed an analysis of the leverage process
both for firms and banks: Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009, 2010), Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009), Flannery (1994), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), Greenlaw et
al. (2008), He et al. (2010), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2011). The behaviour of the
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leverage level is a component of a more general discussion on firm and bank capital
structure, such as in Booth et al. (2001), Diamond and Rajan (2000), Gropp and
Heider (2010), Lemmon et al. (2008), Rajan and Zingales (1995).
As for the capital structure of firms, almost all previous papers proposing
an agent based approach assumed a “pecking order” theory (Donaldson, 1961;
Myers and Majluf, 1984), according to which, when information is asymmetric,
investments are financed first with internal funds, then with debt (if internal funds
are not enough), and equity is used as a last resort. A different perspective on the
firms’ financial structure was proposed by the “trade-off” theory, firstly observed in
a paper concerning asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and in a work
on underinvestment (Myers, 1977). This theory is based on the trade-off between
the costs and benefits of debt and implies that firms select a target debt-equity ratio.
The empirical literature found at first contrasting evidence to support these theories.
Then, a refined version of the trade-off theory was proposed: the “dynamic trade-
off theory” (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). In this theory firms actively pursue target
debt ratios even though market frictions temper the speed of adjustment. In other
words, firms have long-run leverage targets, but they do not immediately reach
them, instead they adjust to them during some periods. Dynamic trade-off seems
to be able to overcome some puzzles related to the other theories, explaining the
stylized facts emerged from the empirical analysis and numerous papers conclude
that it dominates alternative hypotheses: Hovakimian et al. (2001), Graham and
Harvey (2001), Mehotra et al. (2003), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Frank and
Goyal (2008).
In this paper we implement an agent based model in which firms’ capital
structure is based on the Dynamic Trade-Off theory. According to this theory, we
assume that firms have a “target leverage”, that is a desired ratio between debt and
net worth, and they try to reach it by following an adaptive rule governing credit
demand. This capital structure is already investigated in the agent based model
proposed by Riccetti et al. (2013) that builds upon the previous work by Delli Gatti
et al. (2010), which was based on a firms’ capital structure given by the Pecking
Order theory.
The modeling framework in which we analyze the effects of introducing
unemployment benefits on financial and macroeconomic conditions is the one
proposed in Riccetti et al. (2012) according to which the macroeconomy is a
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complex system populated by heterogeneous agents (households, firms and banks)
which directly interact in different markets (goods, labor, credit, and bank deposits).
Then, there are two policy makers: the government and the central bank. In this
context, aggregate regularities emerge from the “bottom up” (Epstein and Axtell,
1996) as statistical properties at the meso and macro levels that derive from the
(simple and adaptive) individual behavioural rules and the interaction mechanisms
which describe the working of markets (Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006; LeBaron and
Tesfatsion, 2008).
Many papers in the field of agent based computational economics investigated
the role of interaction in a heterogeneous agents setting, exploring the properties of
a methodological alternative to neoclassical, that is Walrasian, microfoundation.
Indeed, when we consider that the economy is a complex system in which aggre-
gate regularities (from meso to macro) emerge from the decentralized interaction
of a multitude of autonomous agents, Heterogeneous Interacting Agents (HIA)
constitutes an effective alternative to the Representative Agent (RA) hypothesis,
which is instead the typical assumption made by mainstream macroeconomics
(Stiglitz and Gallegati, 2011). Various authors proposed an agent based approach
to the study of complex (macro)economic dynamics; just to make a few exam-
ples: Ashraf et al. (2013), Delli Gatti et al. (2005a, 2009, 2010), Deissenberg et
al. (2008), Dosi et al. (2006, 2010, 2012), Fagiolo et al. (2004), Haber (2008),
Howitt and Clower (2000), Lengnick (2013). On these methodological bases, some
contributions have proposed an analysis of economic policy issues as the role
of monetary policy (Delli Gatti et al. 2005b; Cincotti et al. 2010, 2012), fiscal
policy and its effect on R&D dynamics (Russo et al., 2007), the combination of
Keynesian management of aggregate demand and Schumpeterian policies aimed at
promoting technological progress (Dosi et al., 2010), the interplay between income
distribution and economic policies (Dosi et al., 2012), monetary and fiscal policies
(Haber, 2008), the effectiveness of various stabilization policies (Westerhoff and
Franke, 2012), labor market policies (Neugart, 2008), the role of regulatory policies
on financial markets (Westerhoff, 2008), the effects of introducing a Tobin-like
tax (Westerhoff and Dieci, 2006; Mannaro et al. 2008;), and so on. Hence, agent
based models represent an alternative formulation of microfoundations suited for a
complex macroeconomic system and this different approach may have important
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implications for policy advice (Dawid and Neugart, 2011). For a comprehensive
review, see Fagiolo and Roventini (2009, 2012).
With the present paper we add some results to the analysis of policy issues
in an agent based macroeconomic framework. In particular, we show that the
countercyclical intervention of the government stabilizes the aggregate demand and
the resulting increase of the labor share, due to the introduction of unemployment
benefits, does not damage the economic system (in term of firms’ profitability) if
the benefit paid to unemployed workers is within a certain range. Instead, when
unemployment benefits goes beyond a “reasonable” level, the subsequent profit
squeeze leads to a marked decrease of the labor demand, resulting in a large
unemployment rate and then in a fall of aggregate demand, so amplifying the
recessionary phase.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model setup and
the characteristics of the four markets which composes our economy: credit
(Subsection 2.1), labor (Subsection 2.2), goods (Subsection 2.3), and bank deposits
(Subsection 2.4); the evolution of agents’ wealth is described in Subsection 2.5,
while the behavior of policy makers is discussed in Subsection 2.6. Model dynamics
are studied in Section 3 in which we report the results of the simulation of the
baseline model; we also provide some Monte Carlo experiments in order to analyze
the interplay between financial and real factors, the characteristics of the business
cycle and the behaviour of the system when an extended crisis happens. Then we
provide a comparison of the baseline model with simulations performed in presence
of unemployment benefits, highliting the potential positive effect of government
intervention. In Section 5 we provide some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Starting from Riccetti et al. (2012), we consider a macroeconomy composed of
households (h = 1,2, ...,H), firms ( f = 1,2, ...,F), banks (b = 1,2, ...,B), a central
bank, and the government, which interact over a time span t = 1,2, ...,T in the
following four markets: (i) credit market; (ii) labor market; (iii) goods market; (iv)
deposit market.
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Agents are boundedly rational and follow (relatively) simple rules of behaviour
in an incomplete and asymmetric information context: households try to buy con-
sumption goods from the cheapest supplier; firms try to accumulate profits by
selling their products to households (they set the price according to their individual
excess demand) and hiring cheapest workers; workers update the asked wage
according to their occupational status (upward if employed, downward if unem-
ployed); households’ saving goes into bank deposits; given Basilea-like regulatory
constraints, banks extend credit to finance firms’ production; firms choose the
banks offering lowest interest rates, while households deposit money in the banks
offering the highest interest rates. The government hires public workers, taxes
private agents and issues public debt. Finally, the central bank provides money to
banks and to the government given their requirements.
To go into details, in each period, at first firms and banks interact in the credit
market. Firms ask for credit to banks given the demand deriving from their net
worth and leverage target; the leverage level changes according to expected profits
and inventories. Banks set their credit supply depending on their net worth, deposits
and the quantity of money provided by the central bank. As said above, they must
comply with some regulatory constraints.
Then, government, firms and households interact in the labor market. The govern-
ment hires public workers. Afterwards, firms hire workers: labor demand depends
on available funds, that is net worth and bank credit.
Subsequently, households and firms interact in the goods market. Firms produce
consumption goods on the basis of hired workers. They put in the goods market
their current period production and previous period inventories. Households decide
their desired consumption on the basis of their disposable income and wealth.
Finally, households determine their savings to be deposited in banks: banks and
households interact in the deposit market.
The interaction between the demand and the supply sides of the four markets
is set by the following decentralized matching protocol. In general, each agent in
the demand side observes a list of potential counterparts in the supply side and
chooses the most suitable partner according to some market-specific criteria.
At the beginning, a random list of agents in the demand side – firms in the credit
market, firms in the labor market, households in the goods market, and banks in the
deposit market – is set. Then, the first agent in the list observes a random subset
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of potential partners; this subset represents a fraction 0 < χ ≤ 1 (which proxies
the degree of imperfect information) of the whole set of potential partners; thus,
the agent chooses the cheapest one. For example, in the labor market, the first firm
on the list, say firm f1 observes the asked wage of a subsample of workers and
chooses the agent asking for the lowest one, say worker h1.
After that, the second agent on the list performs the same activity on a new random
subset of the updated potential partner list. In the case of the labor market, the new
list of potential workers to be hired no longer contains the worker h1. The process
iterates till the end of the demand side list (in our example, all the firms enter the
matching process and have the possibility to employ one worker).
Then, a new random list of agents in the demand side is set and the whole
matching mechanism goes on until either one side of the market (demand or supply)
is empty or no further matchings are feasible because the highest bid (for example,
the money till available to the richest firm) is lower than the lowest ask (for example,
the lowest wage asked by till unemployed workers).
As for the entry-exit process, new entrants replace bankrupted agents according
to a one-to-one replacement. New agents enter the system with initial conditions
we will define below. Moreover, the money needed to finance entrants is subtract
from households’ wealth.1
Now, we propose a detailed description of the markets.
2.1 Credit Market
Firms aim at financing production and banks may provide credit to this end. Firm’s
f credit demand at time t depends on its net worth A f t and the leverage target l f t .
Hence, required credit is:
Bdf t = A f t · l f t (1)
1 In the extreme case in which private wealth is not enough, then government intervenes. However,
we can anticipate that it never happens in our simulations.
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The evolution of the leverage target depends on the following rule:
l f t =

l f t−1 · (1+α ·U(0,1)) , if pi f t−1/(A f t−1+B f t−1)> i f t−1 and yˆ f t−1 < ψ · y f t−1
l f t−1, if pi f t−1/(A f t−1+B f t−1) = i f t−1 and yˆ f t−1 < ψ · y f t−1
l f t−1 · (1−α ·U(0,1)) , if pi f t−1/(A f t−1+B f t−1)< i f t−1 or yˆ f t−1 ≥ ψ · y f t−1
(2)
where α > 0 is a parameter representing the maximum percentage change
of the relevant variable (in this case the target leverage), U(0,1) is a random
number picked from a uniform distribution in the interval (0,1), pi f t−1 is the gross
profit (realized in the previous period), B f t−1 is the previous period effective debt,
pi f t−1/(A f t−1+B f t−1) is the return on assets that we will call also profit rate, i f t−1
is the nominal interest rate paid on previous debts2, yˆ f t−1 represents inventories
(that is, unsold goods), 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1 is a parameter representing a threshold for
inventories based on previous period production y f t−1. Equation 2 means that the
leverage target increases (decreases) if the profit rate is higher (lower) than average
interest rate and there is a low (high) level of inventories.
On the supply side, bank b offers a total amount of money Bdbt depending on
net worth Abt , deposits Dbt , central bank credit mbt , and some legal constraints
(proxied by the parameters γ1 > 0 and 0≤ γ2 ≤ 1 that represents respectively the
maximum admissible leverage and maximum percentage of equity to be invested
in lending activities):
Bdbt = min(kˆbt , k¯bt) (3)
where kˆ = γ1 ·Abt , k¯ = γ2 ·Abt +Dbt−1+mbt . Moreover, in order to reduce risk
concentration, banks lend to a single firm up to a maximum fraction β of the total
amount of the credit Bdbt . This behavioural parameter can be also interpreted as a
regulatory constraint to avoid excessive concentration.
2 It is a mean interest rate calculated as the weighted average of interests paid to the lending banks.
www.economics-ejournal.org 10
conomics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal
Bank b charges an interest rate on the firm f at time t according to the following
equation:
ib f t = iCBt + iˆbt + i¯ f t (4)
where iCBt is the nominal interest rate set by the central bank at time t, iˆbt is a
bank-specific component, and i¯ f t = ρ l f t/100 is a firm-specific component, that is
a risk premium on firm target leverage (with ρ > 0).
The bank-specific component evolves as follows:
iˆbt =
{
iˆbt−1 · (1−α ·U(0,1)) , if Bˆbt−1 > 0
iˆbt−1 · (1+α ·U(0,1)) , if Bˆbt−1 = 0
(5)
where Bˆbt−1 is the amount of money that the bank did not manage to lend to
firms in the previous period.
As a result of the interaction based on the matching mechanism explained
above, each firm ends up with a credit B f t ≤ Bdf t and each bank lends to firms an
amount Bbt ≤ Bdbt . The difference between desired and effective credit is equal to
Bdf t −B f t = Bˆ f t and Bdbt −Bbt = Bˆbt , for firms and banks respectively. Moreover,
we assume that banks ask for an investment in government securities equal to
Γdbt = k¯bt −Bbt . If the sum of desired government bonds exceeds the amount of
outstanding public debt then the effective investment Γbt is rescaled according to a
factor Γdbt/∑Γ
d
bt . Instead, if public debt exceeds the banks’ desired demand, then
the central bank buys the residual amount.
2.2 Labor Market
First of all, the government hires a fraction g of households. The remaining part
is available for working in the firms. Firm’s f labor demand depends on the total
capital available: A f t +B f t . Each worker posts a wage wht which is updated as
follows:
wht =
{
wht−1 · (1+α ·U(0,1)) , if h employed at time t−1
wht−1 · (1−α ·U(0,1)) , if h unemployed at time t−1
(6)
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The required wage has a minimum equal to: θ pˆt−1(1+τ), where θ is a positive
parameter, pˆ is the maximum price of a single good, and τ is the tax rate on labor
income. This means that a worker asks at least a wage net of taxes able to buy a
multiple θ of a good.
As a result of the decentralized matching between labor supply and demand,
each firm ends up with a number of workers n f t and a residual cash (insufficient
to hire an additional worker). Obviously, a fraction of households may remain
unemployed. In the baseline model, the wage of unemployed people is set equal to
zero.
Then, we remove this assumption by introducing an unemployment benefit
paid by the government. Accordingly, if the h-th worker is unemployed at time t
then her income is given by:
wht = η pˆt−1 (7)
where η is a positive parameter and pˆ is the maximum price of a single good,
in order to have an unemployment benefit tied to the price level. We will explore
the role of this parameter on model behavior in the computational experiments
proposed below.
2.3 Goods Market
In the goods market households represent the demand side, while firms are the
supply side. Households set the desired consumption as follows:
cdht = c1 ·wht + c2 ·Aht (8)
where 0 < c1 ≤ 1 is the propensity to consume current income, 0≤ c2 ≤ 1 is
the propensity to consume the wealth Aht . If the amount cdht is smaller than the
average price of one good p¯ then cdht = min(p¯ ,wht +Aht). By summing up the
individual consumption of households we obtain the aggregate demand. It is worth
noticing that current income derives from both a cyclical private industrial sector
and an acyclical public service sector.
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The amount of goods produced by the f -th firm is given by:
y f t = φ ·n f t (9)
where φ ≥ 1 is a productivity parameter and n f t is the number of workers
employed by firm f at time t.
Then, firms want to sell this produced output plus the inventories yˆ f t−1. The
selling price is set as follows:
p f t =
{
p f t−1 · (1+α ·U(0,1)) , if yˆ f t−1 = 0 and y f t−1 > 0
p f t−1 · (1−α ·U(0,1)) , if yˆ f t−1 > 0 or y f t−1 = 0
(10)
Hence, the firm rises the price if there are no inventories (and it produced some
goods in the previous period) and viceversa. The minimum price at which firms
want to sell their output is set such that it is at least equal to the average cost of
production, that is ex-ante profits are at worst equal to zero.
As a consequence of the interaction between the supply and demand sides
in the goods market, each household ends up with a residual cash, that is not
enough to buy an additional good and that she will try to deposit in a bank; at the
same time, firms sell an amount 0≤ y¯ f t ≤ y f t and they may remain with unsold
goods; as a consequence, in the next period the firm will try to sell the inventories
yˆ f t = y f t − y¯ f t .
2.4 Deposit Market
Banks represent the demand side of the deposit market (given that they require
capital to extend credit) and households are on the supply side. Banks offer an
interest rate on deposits according to their funds requirement:
iDbt =
{
iDbt−1 · (1−α ·U(0,1)) , if k¯bt −Bbt −Γbt > 0
min{iDbt−1 · (1+α ·U(0,1)) , iCBt}, if k¯bt −Bbt −Γbt = 0
(11)
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where Γbt is the amount of public debt bought by bank b at time t. Hence,
the previous equation states that if a bank exhausts the credit supply by lending
to private firms or government then it decides to increase the interest rate paid on
deposits, so to attract new depositors, and viceversa. However, the interest rate on
deposits can increase till a maximum given by the policy rate rCBt which is both
the rate at which banks could refinance from the central bank and the rate paid by
the government on public bonds.
Then, households set the minimum interest rate they want to obtain on bank
deposits as follows:
iDht =
{
iDht−1 · (1−α ·U(0,1)) , if Dht−1 = 0
iDht−1 · (1+α ·U(0,1)) , if Dht−1 > 0
(12)
where Dht−1 is the household h’s deposit in the previous period. This means
that a household that found a bank paying an interest rate higher or equal to the
desired one decides to ask for a higher remuneration. In the opposite case, she
did not find a bank satisfying her requirements, thus she kept her money in cash
and now she asks for a lower rate. We hypothesize that a household deposits
all the available money in a single bank that offers an adequate interest rate. A
household that decides to not deposit her money in a bank signals a preference for
liquidity, because she does not accept to deposit her cash for an interest rate below
the desired one.
2.5 Wealth Dynamics
Firms
As a result of the outcomes of the credit, labor and goods markets, the firm f ’s
profit is equal to:
pi f t = p f t · y¯ f t −Wf t − I f t (13)
where Wf t is the firm f ’s wage bill, that is the sum of wages paid to employed
workers, and I f t is the sum of interests paid on bank loans.
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Firms pay a proportional tax τ on positive profits; negative profits are subtracted in
the computation of the taxes that should be paid on the next positive profits. We
indicate net profits with p¯i f t .
Finally, firms pay a percentage δ f t as dividends on positive net profits. The fraction
0≤ δ f t ≤ 1 evolves according to the following rule:
δ f t =
{
δ f t−1 · (1−α ·U(0,1)) , if yˆ f t = 0 and y f t > 0
δ f t−1 · (1+α ·U(0,1)) , if yˆ f t > 0 or y f t = 0
(14)
This means that firms distribute less dividends when they need self-financing to
expand production (that is, they do not have inventories) and viceversa. The profit
net of taxes and dividends is indicated by pˆi f t . In case of negative profits pˆi f t = pi f t .
Thus, the evolution of firm f ’s net worth is given by:
A f t = (1− τ ′) · [A f t−1+ pˆi f t ] (15)
where τ ′ is the tax rate on wealth (applied only on wealth exceeding a threshold
τ¯ ′ · p¯, that is a multiple of the average goods price).
If A f t ≤ 0 then the firm goes bankrupt and a new entrant takes its place. The
initial net worth of the new entrant is a multiple of the average goods price, while
the leverage is one. Moreover, the initial price is equal to the mean price of survival
firms. Banks linked to defaulted firms lose a fraction of their loans (the loss given
default rate is calculated as 1− (A f t +B f t)/B f t).
Banks
According to the operations in the credit and the deposit markets, the bank b’s
profit is equal to:
pibt = intbt + iΓt ·Γbt − iDbt−1 ·Dbt−1− itCB ·mbt −badbt (16)
where intbt represents the interests gained on lending to non-defaulted firms, iΓt
is the interest rate on government securities (Γbt), and badbt is the amount of “bad
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debt” due to bankrupted firms, that is non performing loans. Bad debt is the loss
given default of the total loan, that is a fraction 1− (A f t +B f t)/B f t of the loan to
defaulted firm f connected with bank b.
Banks pay a proportional tax τ on positive profits; negative profits will be used
to reduce taxes paid on the next positive profits. We indicate net profits with p¯ibt .
Finally, banks pay a percentage δbt as dividends on positive net profits. The
fraction 0≤ δbt ≤ 1 evolves according to the following rule:
δbt =
{
δbt−1 · (1−α ·U(0,1)) , if Bbt > 0 and Bˆbt = 0
δbt−1 · (1+α ·U(0,1)) , if Bbt = 0 or Bˆbt > 0
(17)
Hence, if the bank does not manage to lend the desired supply of credit then
it decides to distribute more dividends (because it does not need high reinvested
profits), and viceversa.
The profit net of taxes and dividends is indicated by pˆibt . In case of negative
profits pˆibt = pibt .
Thus, the bank b’s net worth evolves as follows:
Abt = (1− τ ′) · [Abt−1+ pˆibt ] (18)
where τ ′ is the tax rate on wealth (applied only on wealth exceeding a threshold
τ¯ ′ · p¯, that is a multiple of the average goods price).
If Abt ≤ 0 then the bank is in default and a new entrant takes its place, with an
initial net worth equal to a random number around a multiple of the cost of the
average price of a good (and the money is taken from households proportionally to
their wealth). Households linked to defaulted banks lose a fraction of their deposits
(the loss given default rate is calculated as (Abt +Dbt)/Dbt). The initial net worth
of the new entrant is a multiple of the average goods price. Moreover, the initial
bank-specific component of the interest rate (iˆbt) is equal to the mean value across
banks.
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Households
As a result of interaction in the labor, goods, and deposit markets, the household
h’s wealth evolves as follows:
Aht = (1− τ ′) · [Aht−1+(1− τ) ·wht +divht + intDht − cht ] (19)
where τ ′ is the tax rate on wealth (applied only on wealth exceeding a threshold
τ¯ ′ · p¯, that is a multiple of the average goods price), τ is the tax rate on income,
wht is the wage gained by employed workers, divht is the fraction (proportional to
the household h’s wealth compared to overall households’ wealth) of dividends
distributed by firms and banks net of the amount of resources needed to finance new
entrants (hence, this value may be negative), intDht represents interests on deposits,
and cht ≤ cdht is the effective consumption. Households linked to defaulted banks
lose a fraction of their deposits as already explained.
2.6 Government and Central Bank
Government’s current expenditure is given by the sum of wages paid to public
workers (Gt), the sum paid for unemployment benefits and the interests paid on
public debt to banks.3 Moreover, government collects taxes on incomes and
wealth and receives interests gained by the central bank. The difference between
expenditures and revenues is the public deficit Ψt . Consequently, public debt is
Γt = Γt−1+Ψt .
Central bank decides the policy rate iCBt and the quantity of money to put into
the system in accordance with the interest rate. In order to do that, the central
bank observes the aggregate excess supply or demand in the credit market and
sets an amount of money Mt to reduce the gap in the subsequent period of time:
Mt = max(0.5Mt−1+0.5CMt−1;0), where CM is the credit mismatch (difference
between the amount of credit required and not obtained by firms and the amout of
credit that banks do not manage to lend) of the previous period.
3 It could also spend an amount Ωt for extreme cases in which the government has to intervene
to finance new entrants when private wealth is not enough. However, in our simulations this never
happens.
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3 Simulations
We explore the dynamics of the model by means of computer simulations. We refer
to Riccetti et al. (2012) for a more detailed description of the simulations output of
the baseline model. The simulations hold a time span of T =150 periods, but we
analyze the results for the last 50 (so the first 100 are used to initialise the model).
Table 1 reports the parameters’ values of the baseline simulation. The initial
agents’ wealth is set as follows: A f 1 =max{0.1,N(3,1)}, Ab1 =max{0.2,N(5,1)},
Ah1 =max{0.01,N(0.5,0.01)}. The central bank sets the policy rate iCBt at 1% and
we leave this value unchanged during simulations. We will remove this assumption
on the Central Bank interest rate in Section 4.2, in which we will perform a
robustness check on the usefulness of the unemployment benefits when the central
bank uses a Taylor-type rule.
In 995 out of 1000 Monte Carlo simulations, we observe the emergence of
endogenous business cycles with the statistical characteristics reported in column
with η = 0 of Table 4 (see page 26). Along the typical business cycle, an increase
of firms’ profits determines an expansion of production and, if banks extend the
required credit, this effect could be amplified resulting in more employment; the fall
of the unemployment rate increases wage inflation that, on the one hand, expands
the aggregate demand, while on the other hand reduces firms’ profits, possibly
causing the inversion of the business cycle. In particular, Figure 1 displays the
evolution of the unemployment rate along the business cycle (upper panel) and the
inverse relationship between unemployment and wage inflation, that is the Phillips
curve (lower panel). In other words, there is a dynamic relation between the
unemployment and the profit rate: the increase of profits boosts the expansion of
the economy and then a fall of the unemployment rate follows (negative correlation
between the profit rate at time t− 1 and the unemployment rate at time t). The
reduced unemployment increases wages, so firms want to save on production costs
(e.g., wage bill) decreasing labor demand. This results in a rise of unemployment
that, in turn, reduces the profit rate at time t+1 due to a lack of aggregate demand.
However, the presence of unemployed people reduces wages and this stimulates
firms to hire a larger number of workers, so boosting the beginning of a new
expansionary phase of the business cycle. All in all, business cycles are basically
determined by the interplay between firm leverage and the dynamics of the wage-
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Table 1: Parameter setting
H number of households 500
F number of firms 80
B number of banks 10
α adjustment parameter 0.05
χ matching imperfect information 0.2
ψ inventory threshold 0.1
γ1 max bank’s leverage 10
γ2 max % of bank’s equity invested in lending 0.5
β max bank’s lending to single firm 0.1
ρ risk premium on firm’s loan 2
c1 propensity to consume current income 0.8
c2 propensity to consume wealth 0.3
θ minimum required wage 1
η unemployment benefit 0
φ firm’s productivity 3
τ tax rate on income 0.3
τ ′ tax rate on wealth 0.05
τ¯ ′ threshold for tax on wealth 3
g % of public workers on population 0.33
profit struggle (see e.g., Goodwin, 1967, Akerlof and Stiglitz, 1969): an increase
in profits expands investment which in turn raises employment and wages; thus the
rise in wages erodes profits and sets the premises for the recessionary phase.
In the remaining 5 out of 1000 simulations the system is characterized by large
and extended crises, that is the average unemployment rate reaches values above the
20%. Differently from the usual business cycle mechanism, the decrease of wages
due to growing unemployment does not reverse the cycle, but rather amplifies
the recession due to the lack of aggregate demand. Indeed, real wage lowers
excessively resulting in a vicious circle for which the fall of purchasing power
prevents firms to sell commodities, then firms decrease production, unemployment
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Figure 1: Baseline model. Simulation results
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continues to rise, and the recession deteriorates. In these cases, the system may
remain trapped in a large crisis unless an exogenous intervention.
As for the financial aspects of the cycle, firms’ leverage and, in particular,
banks’ exposure enlarge business fluctuations: when firms are growing they ask
for more credit and, if banks extended new loans, then they are able to expand
the production; after a while, the rise of employment fosters wages that, together
with the rise of interest payments on an increasing debt, reduces firms’ profitability.
Thus, the business cycle reverses and financial factors amplify the recession,
indeed the relatively low level of profits with respect to interest payments induces a
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deleveraging process. According to the empirical evidence (for example, Kalemli-
Ozcan et al., 2011), there is a modest firms’ leverage procyclicality, while there is
a more significant banks’ leverage procyclicality. Then, banks’ capitalization is the
most important determinant of credit conditions, so influencing firms’ leverage and
the macroeconomic evolution.
The presence of the government plays a central role in mitigating output
volatility through stabilizing the aggregate demand. We show the importance of
this acyclical sector with a sensitivity analysis on the parameter g (the percentage of
public workers on active population): we repeat the same simulation 21 times (on
time span T=150) with values of g ranging from 20% to 40%, with step 1%.4 The
mean unemployment rate in the last 50 periods of the simulation (101≤ t ≤ 150)
is reported in Figure 2. It clearly emerges that a larger acyclical sector implies
a lower average unemployment rate: when g = 20% (and τ = 17%) the mean
unemployment rate is above 20% (20.14%), while when g = 40% (and τ = 37%)
it is below 8% (7.71%). Instead, the standard deviation of the unemployment rate
does not largely change among simulations, always remaining about 2−3%.
The previous macroeconomic features are influenced by the peculiar aspects of
the matching mechanism in various markets. We can show, with two sensitivity
analyses, that the matching characteristics have different effects depending on the
markets involved.
The first sensitivity analysis regards the deposit market. We compare three simula-
tions with the same random seed, but with different values for the parameters α
used in equations 11 and 12:
1. α = 0.05 for both equations, as in the baseline model;
2. α = 0.10 in equation 11 and α = 0.05 in equation 12; that is, the offered
interest rates by banks move more rapidly than the required interest rates by
household;
3. α = 0.05 in equation 11 and α = 0.10 in equation 12; that is, the required
interest rates move more rapidly than the offered interest rates.
4 In order to stabilize the public deficit at a common level among the simulations (about 3%), we
change at the same time also the tax rate on income τ , starting from τ = 17% to τ = 37%, with step
1% (in this way a value of g = 33% corresponds to a τ = 30%, as in the baseline setting).
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Figure 2: Average unemployment rate: sensitivity analysis on parameters g (and τ) ranging from
g = 20% to g = 40% (and from τ = 17% to τ = 37%), with step 1%.
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Table 2 shows the mean unemployment rate and the standard deviation of the
unemployment rate in the three simulations during periods 101≤ t ≤ 150.
Cases 1 and 2 are almost identical, then if banks and households adjust their
offered and required interest rate at the same speed or if banks adjust their offered
rate more rapidly has not an impact (at least till a certain threshold). Instead, if
households move their required interest rate more rapidly than the rate offered by
banks (simulation 3) the mismatch makes the unemployment rate to raise to 12%.
The difference between cases 2 and 3 could be due to the fact that banks have an
Table 2: Sensitivity analysis about different behavioural sluggishness in the deposit market matching.
Case 1 2 3
Unemployment rate 8.42% 8.37% 12.09%
Unemployment volatility 1.87% 1.77% 2.04%
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upper bound in their interest rate setting given by the central bank interest rate.
This may increase the fraction of liquid money hold by households, so resulting in
a shrinking of banks credit supply. However, this effect that could be present in the
economic reality, here is too strong due to the lack of alternative financial channels
for banks to collect money (for instance bonds). All in all, the macroeconomic
system behaves always in the same way, even if the mismatch could create some
problems as an increase of unemployment.
The second sensitivity analysis shows how a different sluggishness in the
adjustment of prices and wages (on their two different markets) can largely impact
the macroeconomic system. We compare three simulations with different values
for the parameters α used in equations 6 and 10:
• α = 0.05 for both equations, as in the baseline model;
• α = 0.10 in equation 6 and α = 0.05 in equation 10; that is, the required
wages move more rapidly than prices;
• α = 0.05 in equation 6 and α = 0.10 in equation 10; that is, prices move
more rapidly than wages, in a more realistic setting.
The macroeconomic system acts similarly in the baseline case and in the more
realistic one, that is when prices move more rapidly than wages, but it behaves
very differently in the second case (see Figure 3). Indeed, when wages move faster
than prices, the system creates very long business cycles with a very high mean
unemployment rate (19.42% as reported in Table 3).
The system shows a much less persistent business cycle features in the other
two cases. However, when prices move faster than wages, the mean unemployment
rate is larger and the business cycle volatility increases compared to the baseline
case. Indeed, in the baseline case the mean unemployment rate over the 50 periods
is 8.42% with a minimum of 4% and a maximum of 12.8%, while in third scenario
the mean is 11.09% with a minimum of 1.6% and a maximum of 24.4%, that is
with a much larger variation.
More in general, the mismatch between the two mechanism enlarges the unem-
ployment (and then the output) volatility, as shown by the values reported in Table
3.
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Figure 3: Unemployment rate in the three cases with different behavioural sluggishness in required
wages and prices.
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Given the importance of this feature in the model, but also in the real economy,
a more accurate analysis is required as a future development of the paper, given that
the model easily allows this kind of study, as for instance a quantitative calibration
of the adjustment parameters for prices and wages. Moreover, we should accurately
investigate the effects of an asymmetric behaviour in the adjustment of prices and
wages, as for instance in the case of downward rigidity of nominal wages. However,
in what follows we focus on the role of unemployment benefits, assuming that the
baseline setting can be quite representative of other cases, such as the one with
Table 3: Sensitivity analysis about different behavioural sluggishness in required wages and prices.
Case 1 2 3
Unemployment rate 8.42% 11.09% 19.42%
Unemployment volatility 1.87% 5.98% 5.32%
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a different sluggishness between the two sides of the deposit market or the more
realistic case in which prices move more rapidly than wages.
4 Unemployment Benefits
In this Section we investigate the effects of introducing unemployment benefits
(UB) in the model. As explained above, in this case the government pays a benefit
to unemployed workers which is given by equation 7. In particular, we set η = 0
in the baseline model, while η = 0.5 in the UB scenario.
4.1 Baseline Model vs. Unemployment Benefit Scenario
As clearly emerges from Table 4, the average rate of unemployment on 1000 Monte
Carlo simulations is markedly lower in the UB scenario (about 6.5%) than in the
baseline model (almost 10%), and this difference is even larger if we consider also
the 5 simulations with big crises (mean unemployment rate above 20%) that we
exclude from the statistics of the baseline model; indeed the big crisis scenario
disappears when unemployment benefits are present (all 1000 simulations are
used for the statistics in the column devoted to the UB scenario). Moreover, we
observe a fall of the default rate for both firms and banks, an improvement of credit
conditions (from an excess demand to an excess supply of credit in the average),
an increase of both firm leverage and bank exposure, while the corresponding
volatilities decrease. The negative effects of the government intervention, that
is the slight increase of both the average inflation rate (from 1.99% to 2.15%)
and the average ratio between the public deficit and the nominal GDP (from
3.26% to 3.37%), have a modest impact on the macroeconomy. In particular, the
larger public expenditure due to providing benefits to unemployed people is quite
well compensated by the increased level of taxes (with an unchanged taxation
rate) deriving from a higher level of GDP in an economy with a lower rate of
unemployment. Then, the government successfully intervenes in the economy
through providing unemployment benefits: in this case unemployed workers can
buy more goods (otherwise they can spend only a fraction of their wealth), indeed
the wage share is slightly larger in the UB scenario, so increasing the demand for
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Table 4: Monte Carlo for η = 0 and η = 0.5 (time span 101-150) of simulations with average unem-
ployment rate below 20%. In brackets the standard deviation among the Monte Carlo simulations.
We always reject the hypothesis that the two Monte Carlo means are not statistically different, with a
p-value below 5%.
Variable η = 0 η = 0.5
Sim. with ur < 20% 995 1000
Unemployment rate 9.92% (1.63%) 6.46% (0.94%)
Unemployment volatility 2.05% (0.48%) 1.52% (0.29%)
Firm default rate 6.45% (2.10%) 3.36% (0.86%)
Bank default rate 0.57% (0.57%) 0.07% (0.13%)
Wage share 63.4% (0.5%) 65.2% (0.3%)
Public deficit 3.26% (0.19%) 3.37% (0.14%)
Interest rate 9.11% (1.93%) 7.67% (1.18%)
Inflation rate 1.99% (0.07%) 2.15% (0.05%)
Credit constraint on GDP 4.23% (8.13%) -6.28% (4.24%)
Firm mean leverage 1.65 (0.24) 1.80 (0.24)
Bank mean exposure 3.27 (1.30) 3.40 (1.12)
Firm leverage volatility 0.12 (0.04) 0.09 (0.04)
Bank exposure volatility 0.51 (0.33) 0.30 (0.17)
produced goods and then firms’ profits; this leads to more employment which
further enlarges the aggregate demand. Furthermore, the results of the model
about the role of unemployment subsidies are very complementary to previous
ones in the agent-based models. In particular, the finding about the stabilizing
role of unemployment subsidies into a regime where investment is profit-driven
complements similar ones obtained in the models by Dosi et al. (2010, 2012),
where investment is driven by expectations about demand.5
All in all, government intervention through unemployment benefits stabilizes
the aggregate demand and the system is more stable despite of a higher level of
both firm leverage and bank exposure. This also means that public intervention
looses the credit constraint to the economy; indeed, the larger credit availability
5 For a comparison between profit-led and demand-led regimes, and an analysis of the effects of
wage flexibility in the two regimes, see Napoletano et al. (2012).
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results in a lower average rate of interest. In other words, a more leveraged financial
sector sustains the expansion of the economy when the government provides more
liquidity to the system through the countercyclical mechanism of unemployment
benefits, with the fundamental cooperation of the central bank which buys the
outstanding public debt.
According to what explained above regarding the role of financial factors,
the introduction of unemployment benefits leads to an increase of both the mean
firm leverage and the mean bank exposure; moreover, for every level of both firm
leverage and bank exposure we clearly observe a lower rate of unemployment, as
shown in Figures 4 and 5. Another relevant aspect is the non-linear relationship that
emerges in the figures. For relatively high levels of firm leverage the unemployment
rate tends to be smaller and less volatile; however, for largest values of the firm
leverage (above 2) the negative relation with the unemployment rate tends to
disappear (Figure 4). As for banks, starting from low levels, an increase of bank
exposure reduces the rate of unemployment; instead, for high levels of bank
exposure (above 5) a further increase makes the unemployment higher. In other
words, if banks increase their exposure enlarging credit to firms, the latter hire
more workers and the unemployment rate decreases. But, when the exposure of
banks becomes “excessive” this leads to instability (more defaults) and the rate
of unemployment may increase (Figure 5). Moreover, in the UB scenario the
relationship between the financial factors and the unemployment rate is flatter and
less volatile. This confirms that the government intervention through UB reduces
the unemployment rate and stabilizes the macroeconomy.
4.2 Robustness Check: Two Taylor Rules
As already explained, the government is assisted by the central bank. Till now,
we have assumed that the central bank sets the policy rate iCBt at 1% and leaves it
unchanged. Now, we remove this assumption to perform a robustness check of our
findings testing two different Taylor-type rules.6
6 Maybe we should talk about a Howitt-type rule: Howitt (1990).
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Figure 4: Average unemployment rate and mean firm leverage: Monte Carlo simulations for the
baseline model (‘circle’) and the unemployment benefit scenario (‘star’).
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Figure 5: Average unemployment rate and mean bank exposure: Monte Carlo simulations for the
baseline model (‘circle’) and the unemployment benefit scenario (‘star’).
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We call the first Taylor rule a “Fed-type” rule, that is the central bank fixes a
target both for unemployment and inflation:
iCBt =Πt−1+0.5(Πt−1− Πˆ)+0.5(uˆ−ut−1) (20)
where Πt−1 is the inflation rate of the previous period, Πˆ is the inflation rate target,
that we fix at 2%, ut−1 is the unemployment rate of the previous period and uˆ is
the unemployment rate target, that we fix at 8%.
The second Taylor rule is an “ECB-type” rule, in which the central bank targets
only the inflation rate:
iCBt =Πt−1+(Πt−1− Πˆ) = 2Πt−1− Πˆ (21)
Moreover we set a lower bound for the policy rate at ¯iCB = 0.5% in both cases.
We perform four (small) Monte Carlo experiments (10 simulations for each
MC), applying one of the two monetary policy rules, with or without unemployment
benefits.
As shown by Table 5, the simulations results are quite similar to that of Table
4, even if the introduction of a Taylor-type rule in the model increases the business
cycle volatility (especially if we extend the simulation, here not reported), given
that in the model the duration of business cycles is quite short and central bank
intervention is based on adaptive expectations, then it is very difficult for the
central bank to stabilize the economy. However, we can confirm the importance
of unemployment benefits also in this setting: with both rules the unemployment
benefits abundantly reduces the average unemployment. This reduction appears to
be larger (and with a lower unemployment volatility) when the central bank also
cares about unemployment, as in the “Fed-type” rule scenario.
However, given the listed shortcomings of the above Taylor-type rule (such as
the adaptive expectations of the central bank) and given the various possibilities
to modify equations 20 and 21 in the weight parameters or in the inflation and
unemployment target levels, we think that this topic deserves further analyses.
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In this Section we perform a sensitivity analysis on the parameter η that determines
the size of unemployment benefits. In particular, we run 1000 simulations for 25
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Table 5: 10 Monte Carlo simulations for η = 0 and η = 0.5 (time span 101-150), when the central
bank applies a FED-like or a ECB-like Taylor-type rule. Statistics for simulations with average
unemployment rate below 20%.
Variable η = 0 η = 0.5 η = 0 η = 0.5
Taylor rule FED FED ECB ECB
Sim. with ur < 20% 9 10 10 10
Unemployment rate 9.50% 4.21% 9.06% 5.51%
Unemployment volatility 5.92% 1.77% 5.60% 3.84%
Inflation rate 2.01% 2.26% 2.02% 2.20%
Inflation rate volatility 0.64% 0.28% 0.60% 0.35%
Interest rate 9.25% 8.39% 8.68% 7.87%
Interest rate volatility 1.55% 0.93% 1.17% 0.80%
different values of η , from 0 to 2.4 with 0.1 step, then 40 replications for each step.
We set θ = η so that the wage required by households is higher or at least equal to
the unemployment benefit.
Figure 6 displays the impact of the parameter η on the following variables:
(i) the unemployment rate, (ii) the firm default rate, (iii) the bank default rate,
and (iv) the real wage. As it clearly emerges, for low levels of η the real wage
is low and the resulting lack of aggregate demand leads to a higher number of
both firms and bank defaults, and a consequent high rate of unemployment. As η
increases there is a rise of the real wage and a consequent increase and stabilization
of the aggregate demand, with a parallel improvement of financial conditions. This
evidently confirms the results explained in the previous Section.
To better appreciate the positive impact of unemployment benefits on macroe-
conomic conditions, we present the same sensitivity analysis for a reduced interval
of the parameter η , that is from 0 to 1.7, in Figure 7. Looking at that figure, we
can clearly see that when η is zero the unemployment rate is about 10%, the firm
default rate is almost 7%, the bank default rate is around 0.6%, and the real wage
is slightly higher than 1.84. As η grows until about 1.5 the system displays a
decreasing rate of unemployment, a rise of the real wage, and a reduction of both
the firm and the bank default rate (in the latter case there is a relevant decrease
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Figure 6: Sensitivity analysis on the impact of the parameter η – from 0 to 2.4 with step 0.1 – on
the unemployment rate, firm default rate, bank default rate, and real wage.
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until when η reaches about 0.5; after that, the number of bank defaults remains
near zero till η reaches 1.5).
However, for large values of η the real wage strongly increase and the resulting
profit squeeze leads to bankruptcy chains (e.g., the default rate for both firms and
banks goes above 50% when η is about or more than 2) and to large crises with
more than half people in the unemployment status; the consequent fall of aggregate
demand reiforces the recession in a vicious circle.
Hence, the growth of η produces beneficial effects on the economy till a thresh-
old of about 1.5. For higher values, the impact of η tends to reverse. Moreover, the
behavior of the system radically changes when the value of η tends to approach 2.
We can explain this feature of our model in the following way. When η is between
0 and about 1.8, the macroeconomy is characterized by a statistical equilibrium
(as a composition of heterogeneous out-of-equilibrium behaviors of single agents)
with typical business fluctuations (that is, without large crises), a reasonable rate
of unemployment, quite stable financial conditions, and a real wage in the range
1.8-1.9. When the value of η is above 1.8, the intervention of the government
through unemployment benefits forces the real wage to be larger than a value
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Figure 7: Sensitivity analysis on the impact of the parameter η – from 0 to 1.7 with step 0.1 – on
the unemployment rate, firm defualt rate, bank default rate, and real wage.
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compatible with the previously described statistical equilibrium and, therefore, the
economy tends to crash.
To sum up, we observe a negative impact of the unemployment benefit on
the economy only if its value is “excessive”, that is when the unemployment
benefit approaches the mean real wage of employed people. Instead, for a large
range below this threshold, increasing unemployment benefits clearly improves
the performance of the economic system via the positive effect on the aggregate
demand.
5 Concluding Remarks
We propose an agent based decentralized matching macroeconomic model that
allow us to investigate the role of government intervention, based on providing
unemployment benefits, in mitigating business cycle fluctuations through both
improving the financial conditions of the system and sustaining the aggregate
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demand. This result depends on a fruitful cooperation between the fiscal policy
implemented by the government and monetary policy managed by the central bank.
Our artificial macroeconomy is composed of heterogeneous agents, that is
households, firms, banks, which interact in four markets (credit, labor, goods,
and deposit markets), and two policy makers: a central bank and the government.
Agents are boundedly rational and operate in an incomplete and asymmetric
information setting by following quite simple rules of behaviour. Households buy
consumption goods from the cheapest supplier, update the asked wage according
to their occupational status (upward if employed, downward if unemployed), and
deposit money in the bank offering a satisfactory interest rates; given Basilea-like
regulatory constraints, banks extend credit to finance firms’ production; firms
choose the banks offering lowest interest rates, and they are aimed at accumulating
profits by selling their products to households and hiring cheapest workers. The
government hires public workers, taxes private agents and issues public debt.
Finally, the central bank provides money to banks, by managing the supply of
money, and the government, by buying oustanding public securities.
In our macroeconomic setting, the consequence of government issuing public
securities to finance unemployment benefits is twofold: (i) the public sector tranfers
a benefit to unemployd people so providing an additional income to be spent, that
is the aggregate demand increases due to public resources; (ii) the public sector
provides liquidity to the private sector so mitigating the credit constraints to firms
and then improving financial conditions. In other words, a more leveraged financial
sector sustains the expansion of the economy when the government provides more
liquidity to the system through the countercyclical mechanism of unemployment
benefits, with the collaboration of the central bank which buys the outstanding
public debt.
We think that our model can provide some suggestions to interpret, at least
some aspects of, the recent evolution of economic and financial conditions in many
countries, after the 2007 financial crisis and the recessive phase that followed
the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15th, 2008. The current crisis is
characterized by financial turmoil on international markets and a slowdown of
economic growth in many (advanced) countries, especially in the periphery of
the Euro area. The austerity strategy is boosting a recessive spiral and the aim of
reaching balanced public finances seems to be impossible to obtain, at least in a
www.economics-ejournal.org 33
conomics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal
reasonable time. Indeed, cutting public expenditure and rising taxation is leading to
higher unemployment in context of low confidence that results in a lack of private
investment, also because the financial sector, that is banks, is not providing all the
credit needed by firms to finance production, and governments are cutting public
investments and the welfare state. According to the IMF, in advanced economies,
stronger planned fiscal consolidation is associated with lower growth than expected
early in the crisis, and this seems to be due to the fact that fiscal multipliers are
substantially higher than implicitly assumed by forecasters (Blanchard and Leigh,
2013).
Moreover, financial conditions in the Euro area, as proxied by the behaviour
of spreads between the interest rate paid on the 10-year German Bund and that
paid on other bonds, have been improved only after the announcement of OMT
(Outright Monetary Transactions) by the ECB President Mario Draghi with which
the central bank can intervene on secondary markets through buying government
securities if a country ask for an ESM (European Stability Mechanisms) help and
then commits its fiscal policy to be subject to certain conditions to assure fiscal
consolidations. This may suggest that a full operativity of the ECB, that is as a
lender of last resort that can also buy outstanding public debt, can be of great help
in assuring “orderly market conditions”, while instead only a commitment to the
objective of a stable and moderate inflation rate may not be enough for financial
stability.
Although the interplay between real and financial aspects, in the Euro area as
well as in other countries, gives rise to very complex questions, which are hard to
solve on the basis of the simulation results of a single model, we show that in our
agent based macroeconomic setting the central bank can positively contribute to the
financial stability of the system by cooperating with the government, so reinforcing
the objectives of fiscal policy. Maybe, then, a high degree of cooperation between
the policy makers may be thought as a possible direction to follow (that is an
aspect to be reconsidered). Moreover, instead of cutting public expenditure, the
government may improve the macroeconomic performance by a countercyclical
action like the one based on providing unemployment benefits, taking care of
avoiding an excessive intervention that may instead squeeze profits and lead the
economy towards recession.
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As for future research, our aim is twofold. On one hand, we want to enrich
the present analysis. For instance, instead of using unemployment benefits, the
government could carry out a countercyclical policy enlarging and reducing the
fraction of public workers, considering the public sector as an “employer of last
resort” along the Minskian tradition (Wray, 2007). We can suppose that both
interventions make the aggregate demand to rise, but they probably present also
different features. The strategy to hire a countercyclical fraction of public workers
could enlarge the economic production (and reduce the labor productivity loss of
unemployed households), but it could be less effective in restoring private sector’s
production, given that there would be less unemployed workers available to private
firms with a reasonable required wage (above the unemployment benefit, but below
the wage paid by the government). However, to analyse the different scenarios
with both kind of interventions, evaluating the gains for firms due to increased
aggregate demand versus increased costs, but also the productivity gains for the
whole society, we need a richer model.
On the other hand, indeed, we want to further extend our macroeconomic
setting. Then, we will introduce new markets, for instance a market for invest-
ment goods, a mechanism of technological progress underlying economic growth,
heterogeneous rules of consumption and the possibility of consumer credit, more
complicated financial behavior based on managing portfolio choices, a varying
number of actors (firms and banks) during the business cycle, different decisional
timings (and frequency) in the various markets, and so on, in order to develop a
useful tool for interpreting the evolution of economic and financial conditions and
to analyze policy issues. With a more complete model, it will also be possible to
better quantitatively calibrate a number of macroeconomic features.
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